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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Randolph Mark Snowball, a.k.a. Mark C. Snowball, appeals from the district 
court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
After a jury trial, Snowball was found guilty of intimidating a witness. (R., pp.4-5.) 
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Snowball to two and a half years 
with one year fixed, to run consecutive to a separate sentence he was already serving. 
(Id.) Snowball appealed and his conviction and sentence were affirmed. (R., p.5; see 
also State v. Snowball, Docket No. 36214, 2010 Unpublished Opinion 701 (Ct. App., 
November 5, 2010).) Snowball filed a petition for review which was denied, with 
remittitur entering on February 14, 2010. (R., p.5.) 
One year and one day later, on February 15, 2011, Snowball filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief alleging three claims: (1) that Snowball was actually innocent of 
the crime; (2) that Snowball was deprived of his confrontation rights under Crawford 1 
and its progeny; and (3) that Snowball received ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., 
pp.4-8.) The state filed a motion to dismiss Snowball's petition on the ground that it was 
untimely. (R., p.37.) Snowball objected to the state's motion, asserting that his claim of 
actual innocence should entitle him to equitable tolling. (R., pp.41-46.) The district 
court, noting that actual innocence had not been established as a ground for equitable 
tolling, granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was 
untimely. (R., pp.49-54.) Snowball filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.65-67.) 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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ISSUE 
Snowball states the issue on appeal as: 
Should this Court adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling the 
statute of limitation for filing a petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Snowball failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his untimely 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Snowball Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His 
Untimely Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Snowball filed his petition for post-conviction relief on February 15, 2011, one 
day after the expiration of the statutorily prescribed time for filing his petition. (R., p.4.) 
The state filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely (R., 
pp.36-37), and the district court granted the motion (R., pp.49-54). Acknowledging that 
his petition was not timely, Snowball asks this Court to extend equitable tolling to free-
standing claims of actual innocence. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Snowball has failed to 
show that his claim of actual innocence merits equitable tolling. The district court's 
order dismissing Snowball's untimely post-conviction petition should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Snowball's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is Untimely And He Has Failed To 
Show A Sufficient Basis For Equitably Tolling The Statute Of Limitation 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. To be timely, a post-conviction proceeding must 
be commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of 
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the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of 
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). Under Idaho 
Code§ 19-4906(c), 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements 
of facts, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
I.C. § 19-4906(c); see also Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. 
Following the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906, the district court 
granted the state's motion for summary dismissal of Snowball's petition for post-
conviction relief on the ground that it was untimely. (R., pp.49-54.) In his underlying 
criminal case, Snowball was convicted of intimidating a witness and appealed. (R., 
pp.4-5.) In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Snowball's 
conviction. (R., p.5; see also State v. Snowball, Docket No. 36214, 2010 Unpublished 
Opinion 701 (Ct. App., November 5, 2010).) After the denial of Snowball's petition for 
review, remittitur was entered on February 14, 2010. (R., p.5.) Snowball filed his post-
conviction relief petition on February 15, 2011 (R., p.4), more than one year after his 
judgment became final on appeal. Snowball's petition for post-conviction relief was 
therefore untimely under Idaho Code § 19-4902, and the district court correctly granted 
the state's motion to dismiss. 
On appeal, acknowledging that his petition is untimely, "Snowball requests that 
this Court adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling" the statute of limitation for 
filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) "[T]he bar for 
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equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high." Chico-Rodriquez v. State, 141 
Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005). While Idaho appellate courts have 
allowed equitable tolling under certain circumstances, absent a showing by the 
petitioner that the limitations period should be tolled, any petition filed outside the one-
year limitation period of Idaho Code § 19-4902 is time-barred and subject to summary 
dismissal. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001); 
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,385,256 P.3d 791,793 (Ct. App. 2011). Snowball has 
failed to show that a free-standing claim of actual innocence merits equitable tolling. 
"Equitable tolling for post-conviction actions 'is borne of the petitioner's due 
process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims."' Schultz, 
151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 P.3d at 793-94 (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115, 
218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). Idaho appellate courts, therefore, have allowed 
for equitable tolling in circumstances where the petitioner is incarcerated in an out-of-
state facility without access to representation or Idaho legal materials, where his mental 
illness or medications render him incompetent and prevent him from pursuing a timely 
challenge to his conviction, or where the petitioner's claim is based on newly discovered 
evidence. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009). Courts, 
however, "have not permitted equitable tolling where the post-conviction petitioner's 
own lack of diligence caused or contributed to the untimeliness of the petition. Rather, 
in cases where equitable tolling was allowed, the petitioner was alleged to have been 
unable to timely file a petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his effective 
control, or the facts underlying the claim were hidden from the petitioner by unlawful 
5 
state action." Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448, 451 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citations omitted). 
Snowball argues that equitable tolling should be extended to free-standing claims 
of actual innocence merely because they are claims of actual innocence. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.10-11.) But the underlying reason for allowing equitable tolling, that the 
petitioner was prevented from timely filing his petition for post-conviction relief and 
thereby deprived of his opportunity to be heard, does not apply to Snowball's claim of 
actual innocence. Snowball was not prevented from timely filing his petition; he simply 
was not diligent in timely bringing his petition. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 220 
P.3d 1066 (2009), is instructive on this point. Addressing Rhoades' argument that 
equitable tolling should apply to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court 
held: 
We have repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims can or should be known after trial. In addressing one of Rhoades' 
previous appeals, we squarely addressed this issue. "Ineffective 
assistance of counsel is one of those claims that should be reasonably 
known immediately upon the completion of the trial and can be raised in a 
post-conviction petition." The facts of the case, being particularly within 
the knowledge of the defendant should be sufficient to alert a defendant to 
the presence of ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, Rhoades 
had access to the material related to his case, including the PGM testing 
results. Rhoades has further alleged that he is innocent. Assuming his 
claim of innocence to be true, even if Rhoades did not know that the PGM 
testing exculpated him, he would have been on notice that it may have 
done so. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly 
dismissed this claim as untimely. 
lg_,_ at 253, 220 P.3d at 1072 (citation omitted). Likewise, actual innocence "is one of 
those claims which should be reasonably known immediately upon the completion of 
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the trial" and "is particularly within the knowledge of the defendant." Snowball's lack of 
diligence in timely filing a claim of which he should have been immediately aware does 
not provide a basis for equitable tolling. 
A separate reason to not create a free-standing actual innocence exception to 
the timeliness requirements of Idaho Code§ 19-4902 is that Snowball failed to present 
a prima facie claim of actual innocence. To establish a claim of actual innocence, the 
standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298 (1995), requires the petitioner to "show that it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence." ~ at 327. 
Though the district court did not dismiss Snowball's petition on the ground that he failed 
to show actual innocence, the court did note that it "reviewed the affidavits of Mark 
Snowball and Whitnee Snowball" and that the court was "not convinced that any juror, 
acting reasonably and considering the testimony in these new affidavits, could not still 
find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (R., p.51.) The district court correctly 
assessed the relative merits of Snowball's actual innocence claim. 
Following a jury trial, Snowball was found guilty of intimidating a witness. (R., 
p.5.) Snowball's claim of actual innocence is premised on his contention that he did not 
intimidate Whitnee; he only told her how she could avoid testifying by avoiding service 
of a subpoena. (R., p.43.) Snowball's claim of actual innocence fails as a matter of law. 
To be guilty of the crime of intimidating a witness, a defendant does not have to prevent 
a witness from testifying by subjectively intimidating that witness. Rather, Idaho Code § 
18-2604 provides: 
Any person who . . . by any manner wilfully [sic] intimidates, 
influences, impedes, deters, threatens, harasses, obstructs or prevents, a 
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witness ... or any person who may be called as a witness or any person 
he believes may be called as a witness in any criminal proceeding ... from 
testifying freely, fully and truthfully in that criminal proceeding ... is guilty of 
a felony. 
I.C. § 18-2604(3). The statute further provides: 
The fact that a person was not actually prevented from testifying 
shall not be a defense to a charge brought under subsection (1 ), (2), (3) or 
(4) of this section. 
I.C. § 18-2604(5). Thus, merely seeking to influence a witness's testimony or impede, 
deter, or obstruct that witness from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully is sufficient to be 
found guilty of this crime. 
The evidence presented by Snowball shows that he committed the crime of 
intimidating a witness. In his letter to Whitnee, he wrote: 
They are also putting out a subpoena for you to come testify at court. 
However, they MUST hand serve you with the subpoena! If they cannot 
hand serve you then the charges will get dropped. If they do hand serve 
you with a copy of that subpoena then you will have to come to court and 
testify or they will put a warrant out for your arrest. The best two options 
you have are to not answer their calls so they cannot hand serve you, OR 
if they do hand serve you, come to court and testify to the fact that I didn't 
do anything. 
(R., p.47 (emphasis original).) Snowball either sought to obstruct Whitnee's testimony 
from being heard in court by instructing her to avoid service of the subpoena, or 
attempted to influence what she would say if brought to testify. His evidence thus fails 
to show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of the crime he clearly 
committed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Rhoades is on point. In that case, the 
Court did not decide whether due process required a free-standing actual innocence 
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exception to the statute of limitation because "the facts alleged by Rhoades [did] not 
establish a prima facie case of actual innocence." kl at 252-53, 220 P.3d at 1071-72. 
Just like the petitioner in Rhoades, Snowball cannot "show that it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" in light of the evidence he 
presented. Therefore, even if actual innocence could provide a basis for equitable 
tolling, Snowball failed to allege a prima facie case of actual innocence. 
Equitable tolling should not be extended to situations where the petitioner is not 
prevented from timely filing his petition, regardless of the claim the petitioner is raising. 
Even if a claim of actual innocence could be the basis for equitable tolling, Snowball's 
claim of actual innocence would fail as a matter of law. This Court should therefore 
decline to extend equitable tolling in this case. Snowball's post-conviction petition was 
untimely and the district court correctly granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal on this ground. The district court's order granting that motion and summarily 
dismissing Snowball's petition should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Snowball's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2013. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of April, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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